The
King of The Quants Takes A Hit
NEW
YORK -- Hedge fund manager Jim Simons of Renaissance Technologies is viewed
with awe in financial circles as much for his amazing track record as for the
concentration of intellectual and computing firepower he has placed at his
disposal, but even he couldn't escape unscathed from the recent turmoil in
quantitative investing. The secretive fund management company Simons founded
back in 1982 actually performed well relative to its few peers in terms of
size and sophistication such as Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) and AQR, with
its main fund reportedly keeping percentage losses in the single digits as
of last week. Still, like with failed hedge fund Long Term Capital Management
nine years before, Renaissance's stumble has shown that even a world-class
roster of scientific minds can't protect it from the vagaries of the market
and the effects of too much money chasing the same strategy. No Special
Sauce Renaissance's track record is undoubtedly impressive and its confidence
had become correspondingly high. Led by eminent mathematician and former government code
breaker Jim Simons, it had been planning to increase its flagship Renaissance
Institutional Equity Fund to as much as $100 billion, which, with leverage,
would have held positions of about a quarter of a trillion dollars, around
175% long and 75% short. Its long track record might have led Renaissance to
think that it had cracked the elusive code of the financial market itself, but
a senior executive at a competing quantitative asset-management firm said that
its techniques were not different enough. "When you start to think you've
got the special sauce, someone else (probably) has it too," said the executive.
The executive said that, even though statistical arbitrage strategies aren't as
similar as recent media reports have suggested - the correlation is about 15% -
high leverage and the growing popularity of the strategy made risks higher than
what they appeared to be. "Models are supposed to mimic what's going
on in the market, but when you get these exceptional movements, you can't capture
that irrationality," said Kenneth Kapner, president of quantitative training
firm Global Financial Markets Institute. "When these guys put these positions
on, is there enough room to get out? A price on a screen doesn't mean anything
- in abnormal market conditions, you have to be sure there's enough liquidity."
David Viniar, chief financial officer of Goldman Sachs, told clients in a conference
call Monday detailing Goldman's own quant funds' steep losses that the unusual
dislocation in stock prices last week was a 22 standard deviation move. In
other words, it should not have happened in the entirety of human history if
returns are what statisticians refer to as log normally distributed. Similarly,
the 1987 stock market crash should not have happened either. Clearly unusual
moves can and do happen, meaning that basing models on even a 150-year history
of stock prices can miss disastrous outliers. Simons acknowledged as much
in an Aug. 9 letter to investors detailing the 8.7% loss over the first six
trading days of August. "We have been caught in what appears to be a
large wave of de-leveraging on the part of quantitative long/short hedge funds,"
he wrote. Renaissance ignored several requests for further comment about
its performance and operations. Not Just Eggheads Turning On a Computer
Prospective investors couldn't help but be impressed by the marketing literature
for RIEF. The computing power assembled for research and trading would be the
envy of any university and its staff bios read like the roster of an Ivy League
scientific faculty with some of the leading minds in physics, math and computer
science. One of RIEF's portfolio managers, George Zweig, is best known for
discovering the subatomic particles known as quarks. On Wall Street, though,
money talks. Beyond the army of PhDs, the performance of Renaissance's former
flagship Medallion Fund, which has been closed to investors since 1993, is
its main calling card. It generated a 36% compound annual return since 1989
after hefty fees - a stunning record. To put this into context, a $100,000
investment in the fund would have grown to almost $19 million by now and close
to $100 million if no fees were deducted. RIEF was designed to be a much
slower-trading fund than Medallion with up to 5,000 stock positions that would
"achieve superior rates of return with low volatility and a relatively
low beta compared to the S&P 500." The firm uses an over 1,500 processor
Linux cluster with five Solaris 6800 Sunfires with 300 terabytes of disk space
just to do research - a collection described as "huge" by a computer
industry professional. Though powerful computers have augmented Renaissance's
success, the asset-management executive stressed that a fund's performance
is a direct result of intellectual capital. "These things are all black-box,
computer-driven algorithms, but they're programmed by smart people and, when
you look at the trades, they make sense," said the executive. "Sometimes
people characterize us as eggheads who just turn on a computer and that's it."
Renaissance is aggressive about maintaining that edge, as an ongoing legal battle
shows. The firm recently settled a high-profile lawsuit against hedge fund
Millennium Partners LP, which hired two physics Phds fired by Renaissance in
2003 for refusing to sign non-compete agreements. The two physicists, Pavel Volfbeyn
and Alexander Belopolsky, have not settled and contend that Simons is using
the lawsuit to intimidate existing Renaissance employees. In its complaint,
Renaissance said that the knowledge taken by Volfbeyn and Belopolsky could
have earned them "hundreds of millions" using intellectual property
that it had spent a fortune amassing. The physicists wrote in a statement provided
by their lawyer that Renaissance's alleged secrets "are nothing more than
general ideas that are well known to people familiar with statistical arbitrage
and quantitative finance" and went on to say that this could hardly cause
direct financial damage to Simons, who earned $1.7 billion last year according
to media reports. For his part, Kapner views Renaissance's aggressiveness
as something seen to a greater or lesser degree at most black box trading firms.
"They're all secretive because they think their models are better than
other people," he said. The extent to which overconfidence in their
model's superiority translated into excessive size and leverage by quant funds
was evident in the steep losses of the past few weeks. "People are
just losing sight of what they were doing," he said. "We used to have
a saying on the trading floor: the greedy become the needy."
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