Per come la vedo io, l'inizio della
guerra dovrebbe ridimensionare le quotazioni dell'oro in quanto ritengo che sia,
in generale, "l'attesa per la guerra" (clima di incertezza) e non "la
guerra" in sé a farne salire le quotazioni. Nel
momento in cui fosse chiara la maniera di risolvere il problema Iraq (guerra o
azione diplomatica) il clima di incertezza verrebbe meno. L'unica incertezza che
rimane, e l'unico vero problema, secondo me, sarà il come verrà
organizzato il "dopo" Saddam. La successione al Governo, insomma, che
comunque è facile ipotizzare diventi filo-americano. Sembra,
inoltre, che l'esito di un blitz in Iraq possa risolversi in tempi brevissimi.
Si dice un paio di settimane. In questo modo si ridimensionerebbero anche le quotazioni
del petrolio (in quanto i pozzi irakeni potrebbero ricominciare a produrre ed
esportare in breve tempo). ----------------------------------------------
Lester Thurow, economista del MIT tra i più noti al mondo Basa
le analisi sullo studio delle ripercussioni avute dopo "desert storm"... "Una
guerra anticipata fa sempre meno danni di una guerra rimandata. Non sono preoccupato
per un eventuale attacco all'Iraq riguardo alle ripercussioni sulla economia globale...
....malgrado i luoghi comuni, non è
stata la guerra del '91 a causare quella recessione che era già cominciata
nel '90 ben prima dell'inizio dei combattimenti. Forse fu proprio la guerra a
tirarci fuori da una crisi ancor peggiore.... ... la lezione tratta da quella
guerra è che aumento del prezzo del greggio e crisi economica non sono
conseguenze della guerra ma dell'attesa della guerra, soprattutto quando ci vuole
molto tempo per prepararla. Dal punto di vista economico meglio una guerra subito
che una guerra domani. L'Iraq estrae la metà del petrolio che estraeva
nel '90 ed in ogni caso il blocco della produzione, stavolta, sarà più
breve. Allora ci vollero 6 mesi per spostare uomini e mezzi nel Golfo prima di
iniziare la guerra. Adesso, se guerra sarà, non avverrà tra 6 mesi
ma molto prima. L'attuale popolazione irachena è composta all'80% da curdi
e sciiti stufi di esser governati da una minoranza sunnita.... ...inoltre
ci sono stati enormi progressi nello sviluppo di armamenti sempre più avanzati
e particolarmente adatti a combattimenti nel deserto... La
prima guerra del Golfo costò 58mld di dollari, una cifra irrisoria su un
PIL che negli USA supera i 10mila miliardi di dollari. Per combatterla non furono
arruolati nuovi soldati e sono state costruite pochissime nuove armi quindi quelli
sono costi che il Pentagono avrebbe comunque dovuto sostenere. Se si vuole essere
cinici si può aggiungere che il materiale andato distrutto nella guerra
era stato costruito in passato e presto sarebbe stato obsoleto. L'unico costo
reale fu spostare uomini e mezzi nel golfo e pagare gli stipendi completi ai riservisti
(invece della paga solita part-time). Aggiungendo i contributi dei tedeschi e
giapponesi corrisposti a titolo di risarcimento per non aver mandato soldati si
può dire che gli statunitensi ci abbiano addirittura guadagnato, non perso.....
I costi più rilevanti saranno quelli per il mantenimento della pace e ricostruzione
infrastrutture civili ed essenziali come ospedali, scuole e polizia...." |
ML:
ECONOMICS RESEARCH:A Look Back to the 1991 Gulf War 11:59am
EST 14-Feb-03 Merrill Lynch (D.Rosenberg (1) 416 369-8756) No Symbols ML++ML++ML
Merrill Lynch Global Securities Research ML++ML++ML ECONOMICS RESEARCH
A Look Back to the 1991 Gulf War David Rosenberg (1) 416 369-8756 **********************************************************************
Investors should assume that Merrill Lynch is seeking or will seek investment
banking or other business relationships with the companies in this report.
**********************************************************************
The prevailing view among many pundits, including Alan Greenspan, is that
uncertainty will fully subside and the economy will gain traction once the Iraq
issue is put to rest. Many invoke the relief in the markets and economic bounceback
that followed the last war against Iraq in early 1991, which: (i) was
less complicated since it was about getting Saddam out of Kuwait and not about
'regime change' (ii) had a full coalition (including the Arab states)
and total UN support (iii) was paid for almost entirely by the allies
as opposed to the cost being borne by an isolated USA (iv) was not
fought against a backdrop of global terrorism fears and (v) did not have
North Korea on the back burner. But relief proved fleeting. While real
GDP did bounce back from -2% a.r. in 1991Q1 to +2% in Q2, the economy did
not embark on a vigorous self-reinforcing cycle for another two years, and
did nothing to cause the bond market or Fed much to fret about for almost
another three years down the road. The war only managed to briefly interrupt
the overriding macro theme of the day-addressing the lingering excesses of
the late 1980s' real estate/debt bubble (S&L's, banking sector credit
crunch, jobless recovery, household balance sheet repair). Consumer
confidence soared in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War-the University
of Michigan index popped to 70.4 in February/91 from 66.8 in January and then
spiked further to 87.7 in March as the war came to an end. But the enduring
story is that the relief faded as the post-bubble workout took over-by the
end of 1991, the sentiment index was 67.5, almost back to where it was just
prior to the onset of the war. The story for the markets is quite similar.
Equities were already coming off a cyclical bear market (as opposed to today's
secular bear), and the first day that the bombs hit Baghdad, the S&P 500
soared almost 4%. In fact, the relief trade was so powerful that the index
jumped another 20% in the next three months. But as the post-1980s' workout
realities set in, the market then began to range-trade for an extended period
(and with more compelling valuation and dividend yield attributes than are
the case today). The long and short of it is that nearly three-quarters of
the runup in the S&P 500 that year was concentrated in just a short three-month
span. As for the bond market, Treasuries rallied at the very onset of
the war-the 10- year yield plunged 19 basis points to 8.05% on January 17th,
but the booming stock market and recovery in consumer sentiment prompted a
yield rebound to 8.36% by the summer of 1991. But the bigger picture is that
it was one of the last few times that investors had the opportunity to pick
up a 10-year Treasury with an "8-handle"-by the end of 1991, it
had rallied all the way down to 6.7%. As for credit, long-term Baa
spreads widened 4 bps to 241 bps on the day of the first bombing in January
1991. But then they quickly followed the equity market's performance and tightened
to around 160 bps by the summer. Once again, once it became apparent that
the economy had more to work out than just geopolitics, spreads began to widen
again and closed out the year at 240 bps - just about where they were when
the air campaign began. The dollar was already in a steep downtrend,
but the weakness was exacerbated by war fears through the second half of 1990
- and the decline continued well into the Gulf War. The DXY bottomed in mid-February
of 1991 and then enjoyed a sizeable rally from the 80.5 low to 97.2 in July
in the months following the cease-fire. Part of this could well have reflected
positive fund-flow impact from the war payments from the allies, which swung
the chronic current account deficit to a surplus during the first half of
1991. But as the economy disappointed in the second half of 1991, like so
many other financial metrics, the DXY sputtered and finished the year at 83
- right where it was when the war began. In Germany, this report
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16:59 GMT Source FC First Call US Categories: FCSY/NOSYM BKR/ML FCIN/NOINDU
FCSU/ECO MST/E/IND |
(ANSA) - FRANCOFORTE, 27 MAR - Una guerra
breve in Iraq avrebbe conseguenze positive per i mercati finanziari. Lo ha
dichiarato Gerd H usler, responsabile del settore capital markets del Fondo monetario
internazionale (Fmi), presentando oggi a Francoforte il 'Global Financial Stability
Report'. L'andamento volatile dei mercati proseguira', ha aggiunto H usler, sottolineando
inoltre che il sistema bancario internazionale e' robusto. (ANSA) FEN
27-MAR-03 12:14 NNN |