Speciale sulla Guerra del Golfo 1990-1991
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27 mar 2003
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Per come la vedo io, l'inizio della guerra dovrebbe ridimensionare le quotazioni dell'oro in quanto ritengo che sia, in generale, "l'attesa per la guerra" (clima di incertezza) e non "la guerra" in sé a farne salire le quotazioni.

Nel momento in cui fosse chiara la maniera di risolvere il problema Iraq (guerra o azione diplomatica) il clima di incertezza verrebbe meno. L'unica incertezza che rimane, e l'unico vero problema, secondo me, sarà il come verrà organizzato il "dopo" Saddam. La successione al Governo, insomma, che comunque è facile ipotizzare diventi filo-americano.

Sembra, inoltre, che l'esito di un blitz in Iraq possa risolversi in tempi brevissimi. Si dice un paio di settimane. In questo modo si ridimensionerebbero anche le quotazioni del petrolio (in quanto i pozzi irakeni potrebbero ricominciare a produrre ed esportare in breve tempo).

----------------------------------------------
Lester Thurow, economista del MIT tra i più noti al mondo
Basa le analisi sullo studio delle ripercussioni avute dopo "desert storm"...

"Una guerra anticipata fa sempre meno danni di una guerra rimandata.
Non sono preoccupato per un eventuale attacco all'Iraq riguardo alle ripercussioni sulla economia globale...

....malgrado i luoghi comuni, non è stata la guerra del '91 a causare quella recessione che era già cominciata nel '90 ben prima dell'inizio dei combattimenti. Forse fu proprio la guerra a tirarci fuori da una crisi ancor peggiore....
... la lezione tratta da quella guerra è che aumento del prezzo del greggio e crisi economica non sono conseguenze della guerra ma dell'attesa della guerra, soprattutto quando ci vuole molto tempo per prepararla. Dal punto di vista economico meglio una guerra subito che una guerra domani. L'Iraq estrae la metà del petrolio che estraeva nel '90 ed in ogni caso il blocco della produzione, stavolta, sarà più breve. Allora ci vollero 6 mesi per spostare uomini e mezzi nel Golfo prima di iniziare la guerra. Adesso, se guerra sarà, non avverrà tra 6 mesi ma molto prima. L'attuale popolazione irachena è composta all'80% da curdi e sciiti stufi di esser governati da una minoranza sunnita....
...inoltre ci sono stati enormi progressi nello sviluppo di armamenti sempre più avanzati e particolarmente adatti a combattimenti nel deserto...

La prima guerra del Golfo costò 58mld di dollari, una cifra irrisoria su un PIL che negli USA supera i 10mila miliardi di dollari. Per combatterla non furono arruolati nuovi soldati e sono state costruite pochissime nuove armi quindi quelli sono costi che il Pentagono avrebbe comunque dovuto sostenere. Se si vuole essere cinici si può aggiungere che il materiale andato distrutto nella guerra era stato costruito in passato e presto sarebbe stato obsoleto. L'unico costo reale fu spostare uomini e mezzi nel golfo e pagare gli stipendi completi ai riservisti (invece della paga solita part-time). Aggiungendo i contributi dei tedeschi e giapponesi corrisposti a titolo di risarcimento per non aver mandato soldati si può dire che gli statunitensi ci abbiano addirittura guadagnato, non perso.....
I costi più rilevanti saranno quelli per il mantenimento della pace e ricostruzione infrastrutture civili ed essenziali come ospedali, scuole e polizia....
"

 
ML: ECONOMICS RESEARCH:A Look Back to the 1991 Gulf War

11:59am EST 14-Feb-03 Merrill Lynch (D.Rosenberg (1) 416 369-8756) No Symbols
ML++ML++ML Merrill Lynch Global Securities Research ML++ML++ML
ECONOMICS RESEARCH
A Look Back to the 1991 Gulf War
David Rosenberg (1) 416 369-8756
**********************************************************************
Investors should assume that Merrill Lynch is seeking or will seek investment
banking or other business relationships with the companies in this report.
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The prevailing view among many pundits, including Alan Greenspan, is that
uncertainty will fully subside and the economy will gain traction once the Iraq
issue is put to rest. Many invoke the relief in the markets and economic
bounceback that followed the last war against Iraq in early 1991, which:

(i) was less complicated since it was about getting Saddam out of Kuwait
and not about 'regime change'

(ii) had a full coalition (including the Arab states) and total UN support

(iii) was paid for almost entirely by the allies as opposed to the cost
being borne by an isolated USA

(iv) was not fought against a backdrop of global terrorism fears and

(v) did not have North Korea on the back burner.

But relief proved fleeting. While real GDP did bounce back from -2% a.r. in
1991Q1 to +2% in Q2, the economy did not embark on a vigorous self-reinforcing
cycle for another two years, and did nothing to cause the bond market or Fed
much to fret about for almost another three years down the road. The war only
managed to briefly interrupt the overriding macro theme of the day-addressing
the lingering excesses of the late 1980s' real estate/debt bubble (S&L's,
banking sector credit crunch, jobless recovery, household balance sheet
repair).

Consumer confidence soared in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War-the
University of Michigan index popped to 70.4 in February/91 from 66.8 in January
and then spiked further to 87.7 in March as the war came to an end. But the
enduring story is that the relief faded as the post-bubble workout took over-by
the end of 1991, the sentiment index was 67.5, almost back to where it was just
prior to the onset of the war.

The story for the markets is quite similar. Equities were already coming off a
cyclical bear market (as opposed to today's secular bear), and the first day
that the bombs hit Baghdad, the S&P 500 soared almost 4%. In fact, the relief
trade was so powerful that the index jumped another 20% in the next three
months. But as the post-1980s' workout realities set in, the market then began
to range-trade for an extended period (and with more compelling valuation and
dividend yield attributes than are the case today). The long and short of it
is that nearly three-quarters of the runup in the S&P 500 that year was
concentrated in just a short three-month span.

As for the bond market, Treasuries rallied at the very onset of the war-the 10-
year yield plunged 19 basis points to 8.05% on January 17th, but the booming
stock market and recovery in consumer sentiment prompted a yield rebound to
8.36% by the summer of 1991. But the bigger picture is that it was one of the
last few times that investors had the opportunity to pick up a 10-year Treasury
with an "8-handle"-by the end of 1991, it had rallied all the way down to
6.7%.

As for credit, long-term Baa spreads widened 4 bps to 241 bps on the day of the
first bombing in January 1991. But then they quickly followed the equity
market's performance and tightened to around 160 bps by the summer. Once
again, once it became apparent that the economy had more to work out than just
geopolitics, spreads began to widen again and closed out the year at 240 bps -
just about where they were when the air campaign began.

The dollar was already in a steep downtrend, but the weakness was exacerbated
by war fears through the second half of 1990 - and the decline continued well
into the Gulf War. The DXY bottomed in mid-February of 1991 and then enjoyed a
sizeable rally from the 80.5 low to 97.2 in July in the months following the
cease-fire. Part of this could well have reflected positive fund-flow impact
from the war payments from the allies, which swung the chronic current account
deficit to a surplus during the first half of 1991. But as the economy
disappointed in the second half of 1991, like so many other financial metrics,
the DXY sputtered and finished the year at 83 - right where it was when the war
began.


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Feb-14-2003 16:59 GMT
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(ANSA) - FRANCOFORTE, 27 MAR - Una guerra breve in Iraq avrebbe conseguenze positive per i mercati finanziari. Lo ha
dichiarato Gerd H usler, responsabile del settore capital markets del Fondo monetario internazionale (Fmi), presentando oggi a Francoforte il 'Global Financial Stability Report'. L'andamento volatile dei mercati proseguira', ha aggiunto H usler, sottolineando inoltre che il sistema bancario internazionale e' robusto. (ANSA)

FEN
27-MAR-03 12:14 NNN


 

 
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Grafico dell'oro nel 1990-1991

 
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